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I. INTRODUCTION
During a hot Philadelphia summer in 1787, some of the greatest
minds of our young nation convened to discuss the shape our Con-
stitution would take. It needed to provide effective governance
(painfully obvious after the failure of the Articles of Confedera-
tion) but it also needed to fiercely safeguard the power of the peo-
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ple. Debate covered a wide range of topics, but perhaps none as
heavily as the power of the Executive.
With the memory of English tyranny still fresh in the Framers'
minds, multiple forms for the Executive were discussed. Some
envisioned a single Executive, others believed a committee would
be less dangerous. The original states themselves had largely
eviscerated the executive power in their own constitutions,' and
the Framers felt a certain ambivalence towards the idea of execu-
tive power. 2 This ambivalence would lead to ambiguities in the
Constitution, particularly in the area of executive power and the
war power.
The beginning of Article II of the United States Constitution
states that "the executive Power shall be vested in a President of
the United States of America." 3 Section 2 appoints the President
as the "Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United
States, and of the Militia of the several States when called into the
actual Service of the United States."4 It is Congress that has the
power "to declare War,"5 though it was understood that the Execu-
tive would have the power to conduct war, once declared, and re-
pel unprovoked attacks.6
From the beginning of presidential history, the Executive has
sought to push the bounds of the war and executive powers. Some
Presidents faced grave crises that threatened the fabric of the Un-
ion itself, while others faced non-traditional conflicts and threats.
The actions of earlier Executives set precedents, for better or
worse, which would be followed by future Presidents. Today, as
we face an uncertain and possibly never-ending "war on terror-
ism," President George W. Bush is seeking to expand his power as
a "wartime president" to a greater extent than any of his prede-
cessors. This comment will examine the history and application of
the war power and will analyze the present Administration and
the "war on terror" itself, through August of 2006. Are President
Bush's actions beyond the pale of constitutionality? Or have we
seen all this before?
1. JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE
CONSTITUTION 250 (1996).
2. Id. at 244.
3. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
4. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
5. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
6. SENATOR JACOB K. JAVITS, WHO MAKES WAR - THE PRESIDENT VERSUS CONGRESS
14 (1973).
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II. HISTORY OF EXECUTIVE POWER AND THE WAR POWER
A. The Executive Power Generally
Central to the difficulty in defining the powers of the Executive
was the effort to define such power in non-monarchical terms.
7
The Framers had vastly divergent views on the Executive and
were especially divided on the issue of executive power. The Fed-
eralists wanted a strong and single Executive, while the Anti-
Federalists feared an elected dictator and preferred a much
weaker Executive. This divergence in views made "the creation of
the presidency ... their most creative act .... [But] [i]t was pre-
cisely because their views diverged so sharply that disagreements
over the power of the presidency emerged as a potent source of
constitutional controversy .... ,,8
The American idea of the Executive emerged from two theories:
mixed government and separation of powers. 9 While the theories
were at times complementary to one another, at other times they
were viewed as alternatives or even rivals. The occasional incom-
patibility of the two paradigms again underscored the ambiva-
lence towards the Executive, and hesitancy of the Framers to con-
centrate too much power in one set of hands. 10
The initial debates over the nature of the Executive focused on
whether the Executive should in fact be one person, and whether
the Executive should have any veto power over the Legislature.
Early in the debate, delegate James Wilson suggested that the
executive power be vested in a single person. After only two days
of debate, the delegates agreed that the presidency of the United
States would be an office held by a single individual."
7. RAKOVE, supra note 1, at 245. For example, the Framers wanted to avoid lifetime
appointments and endeavored to ensure that the Executive would not have supreme power,
but rather would have to share power through a checks and balances system. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. The idea of mixed government was developed by Charles I in HIS MAJESTIES
ANSWER TO THE XIX PROPOSITIONS OF BOTH HOUSES OF PARLIAMENT, published after the
English Revolution in 1642, and Charles Montesquieu's DE L'ESPRIT DES LOIS (THE SPIRIT
OF THE LAWS), published in 1748, describing Montesquieu's separation of powers theory.
Id. Mixed government embodied the idea that the branches would at times overlap in
certain spheres, while separation of powers proposed the checks and balances of each
branch vis-A-vis the others. Id. at 245-46.
10. Id. at 249.
11. Id. at 257-58. Other Framers, such as George Mason, had proposed a plural Execu-
tive, ranging from a three-person Executive to a six-person Executive. Id. at 268-69. In
fact, one of his greatest reasons for not signing the new Constitution was his displeasure
and fear of a single Executive with no Constitutional Council to advise the Executive
Branch. Id. at 269. Mason believed that a failure to have such a Council would surely
Summer 2007 703
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Debate over the veto power was slightly more contentious.
Principles of separation of powers seemed to indicate that the Ex-
ecutive should not conflict with the will of the Legislature, but
merely execute the laws of Congress. Delegate Roger Sherman of
Connecticut remarked that no provision for the Executive was
even necessary, as the President should be 'nothing more than an
institution for carrying the will of the Legislature into effect."' 12
Others preferring a mixed government view, especially Alexander
Hamilton, favored an absolute veto power. 13 Between these two
extremes, the delegates settled on a limited veto power, a decision
that illustrated the unique genius of the new Constitution.
In the Constitution, mixed government and separation of pow-
ers theories were harmonized. As Madison wrote in The Federal-
ist No. 51, "the power surrendered by the people is first divided
between two distinct governments, and the portion allotted to each
subdivided among .. . separate departments .... [T]he different
governments will control each other, at the same time that each
will be controlled by itself."14 Although there would be intersec-
tion between the branches, the branches themselves would main-
tain their separation through checks and balances. 15
Initial debate ended with the decision to elect the President via
electoral college, which would itself be elected by the Senate. 16
Thus ended the first phase of debate over the Executive. Next, the
Framers would have to decide exactly which powers the new Ex-
ecutive would possess. The most important and hotly debated
among these was the President's power in war.
B. The War Power
Delegate Charles Pinckney remarked that he was for a "vigor-
ous Executive," but was afraid the executive powers might "extend
to peace and war, etc., which would render the Executive a Mon-
archy, of the worst kind, to wit, an elective one." 17  Other Fram-
leave the President "unsupported by proper information and advice, and [would] generally
be directed by minions and favorites .. " RAKOVE, supra note 1, at 269.
12. RAKOVE, supra note 1, at 256 (quoting 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF
1787 (Max Farran ed., 1937)).
13. Id. at 257.
14. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 161 (James Madison) (Roy P. Fairfield ed., 1966).
15. Id. at 146.
16. RAKOVE, supra note 1, at 259. The popular election of the electoral college was not
the original form, but was adopted by the 23rd Amendment. See U.S. CONST. amend.
XXIII.
17. RAKOVE, supra note 1, at 257 (citing RECORDS, supra note 12).
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ers were cautious as to the abilities of the Executive in making
war. Although all the delegates were confident in General George
Washington's ability to resist abusing executive power, they were
not as confident in the abilities of his successors.' 8 The debate
over war powers indicated that lack of faith and evidenced the
Framers' desire to ensure that "one man alone would be unable to
change the state of the nation from peace to war." 19
Although it had been decided that Congress would possess the
power to declare war and the President would be the Commander
in Chief, the degree and range of these powers also were pressing
concerns for the Framers. 20 Hamilton, unsurprisingly, favored a
powerful Executive, writing in The Federalist, No. 23 that "these
powers ought to exist without limitation, because it is impossible
to foresee or define the extent and variety of national exigen-
cies." 2' Other delegates were horrified, and Elbridge Gerry stated
that he "never expected to hear in a republic a motion to empower
the Executive alone to declare war."22  George Mason agreed,
maintaining that it was unsafe to allow the Executive such power.
He supported "clogging rather than facilitating war."23 Sherman
stated firmly that the Executive 'should be able to repel and not
commence war."' 24 In this instance, Hamilton and his followers
were the minority, and Congress was endowed with the power to
raise and support armies and navies, make the rules and regula-
tions for such forces, call out the militia, declare war and generally
exercise all of the policy functions associated with war. From the
Convention's perspective, the role of the Executive should be lim-
ited to that of Commander in Chief.25
The executive power was, for better or worse, finally described.
In some instances the executive powers were quite clear and in
18. JAVITS, supra note 6, at 10.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. THE FEDERALIST No. 231, at 59 (Alexander Hamilton) (Roy P. Fairfield ed., 1966).
A few years after ratification of the Constitution, James Madison had a rare disagreement
with Hamilton over the nature of executive war powers. JAVITS, supra note 6, at 14. Madi-
son accused Hamilton of using the "executive power" clause as a "convenient cloak for the
assumption of 'policy forming powers constitutionally independent of direction by Congress,
though capable of being checked by it."' Id.
22. JAVITS, supra note 6, at 13.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 14.
25. Id. Another key source of dispute for future generations was what "Commander in
Chief' actually means. Id. at 14-15. It appears that the Convention did not discuss this
issue in great detail, as they believed Washington would illustrate the proper interpreta-
tion of this clause through his own actions as the first President of the United States. Id.
Summer 2007 705
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others they were necessarily ambiguous. It would be the task of
future Presidents to attempt to enlarge that power, while Con-
gress and the Supreme Court aimed to keep that power in check.
After Washington's presidency ended, John Adams and Thomas
Jefferson wasted little time before testing the extent of their pow-
ers.
III. EARLY PRESIDENTIAL ACTIONS
While "quasi-war" can be used to describe many twentieth and
twenty-first century conflicts, it is not a modern invention. Presi-
dent John Adams and President Thomas Jefferson both involved
the United States in quasi or undeclared wars. 26 However, two
vastly different styles and degrees of deference to the Constitution
were exhibited by these men.
A. President Adams and Quasi- War
Upon taking office as the second President, John Adams inher-
ited an undeclared war with France. 27 The hostilities between
France and the United States were largely a result of Washing-
ton's unfriendliness to France's new revolutionary government
and a treaty between Great Britain and the United States recog-
nizing British interpretation of the laws of the sea. As relations
between the French and American governments declined, acts of
economic and even military hostility increased. 28
The deteriorating situation led to a divide among both Congress
and the public over the idea of war with France. Some Federalists
in Congress, members of the President's own party, clamored for
war; the Jeffersonian Republicans, led by Vice President Jeffer-
son, were reluctant. President Adams was torn between his desire
to protect American interests and avoid declaring war without
united public support. 29 His initial course of action was to assert
American rights on the high seas, but avoid actual war. 30 Addi-
tionally, he requested a special session of Congress in order to
"'consult and determine on such measures as in their wisdom shall
be deemed meet for the safety and welfare of the said United
26. Id. at 25, 36.
27. JAVITS, supra note 6, at 27.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 28.
30. Id. at 27.
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States of America."' 31 As Senator Javits wrote, "there was never a
question in Adams' mind of taking a national position without re-
gard to the views of the body empowered to declare war." 32
During the special session, President Adams requested an in-
crease in armed power, but this request was not met with a favor-
able congressional response. 33 He also proposed sending a diplo-
matic commission to France. 34 The diplomatic mission was met
with approval, and the United States attempted to negotiate with
the French Government. 35 This mission, however, was met with
such a disrespectful response, that once the details of the mis-
sion's treatment were made public, the public mood began to
shift.36 Although President Adams originally sought to use the
new change in public opinion to push for a declaration of war,
Congress was still not overwhelmingly receptive to the idea. 37
Before President Adams could exert much pressure, diplomatic
channels re-opened, and President Adams maintained a state of
quasi-war until the entire situation was resolved. 38
During this quasi-war, President Adams exercised great self-
restraint as the Executive and exhibited appropriate respect for
the Constitution. Despite his initial inclinations and the wishes of
a loud faction of his own party, President Adams would not com-
mit the United States to a course of military action without con-
gressional authorization. Though President Adams often came to
the point of "drafting a belligerent request for a declaration of
war," he never drafted such a request. 39 The passage of time, cou-
pled with changes in information and public opinion, caused vacil-
lations in President Adams's opinion several times. These
changes in opinion, however, would have meant little had he not
felt restrained by the Constitution the first time he contemplated
drafting that "belligerent request." 40 Not every future President
would feel the same compulsion President Adams felt to choose
31. Id. at 28. See also 1 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS (James D. Richard-
son ed., 1907).
32. JAVITS, supra note 6, at 28-29.
33. Id. at 29.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. The result of the diplomatic mission was known as the XYZ Affair, in which the
French Government attempted to extort $250,000 from the American mission before they
would even agree to discuss the hostilities. Id.
37. JAVITS, supra note 6, at 29.
38. Id.




the right course of action, despite personal and political cost.
Clearly, institutional barriers against impulsive action were and
are still necessary. The division of the war power between Con-
gress and the President provides this barrier. Had President Ad-
ams failed to respect the constitutional mandate that "Congress
shall have power to declare war," a costly war would have ensued
- one which may have been fatal to the young United States.
B. President Jefferson and Private War
The war occurring during President Jefferson's presidential
term was very different from Adams's quasi-war. President Jef-
ferson expanded the paradigm of the executive war power through
war with the Barbary Pirates. According to Senator Javits, the
Barbary War "appears in many ways to be filled with a presiden-
tial will to make war out of personal conviction unmatched until
the days of the struggle in Vietnam." 41  Conflict with the Barbary
Pirates had plagued many of the seafaring nations for decades.
Controlled by principalities along the shores of Algiers, Morocco,
Tripoli and Tunis, the Barbary Pirates terrorized ships in their
waters, demanding high ransoms, oftentimes capturing and en-
slaving the crews, and demanding exorbitant annual fees from
nations who wished to ensure protection for their merchant ma-
rines. 42 There was no question that the Pirates were dangerous
and costly, but President Jefferson's desire to wage war against
them had less to do with their methods and more to do with his
own desire to see the United States develop a powerful naval
force. 43
Using previous attacks upon American ships as a justification,
President Jefferson directed the Secretary of the Navy to send a
naval force abroad to assure the safety of marine commerce, with
the indication that any resistance offered by the Barbary Pirates
was to be met with proportional force. 44 These directives evolved
into a plan to overthrow the Pasha (or King) of Tripoli and replace
him with a brother more amicable to American interests.
45
41. Id. at 37. Perhaps the Iraq Conflict now has set the standard for "presidential will
to make war out of personal conviction."
42. JAVITS, supra note 6, at 39. See also RAY W. IRWIN, THE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS OF
THE UNITED STATES WITH THE BARBARY POWERS, 1776-1816 (1931).
43. JAVITS, supra note 6, at 41. See also GLENN TUCKER, DAWN LIKE THUNDER: THE
BARBARY WARS AND THE BIRTH OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY (1963).
44. JAVITS, supra note 6, at 43.
45. Id. at 45. See also 2 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS, FOREIGN RELATIONS (1832-1861).
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In directing all of these expeditions, President Jefferson indeed
conducted a war against the Barbary Pirates. Although it was
successful, President Jefferson's actions were largely outside the
bounds of constitutionality. While he convinced Congress eventu-
ally to assent to many of his requests, he took on his own what
Congress would not grant.46 His actions essentially placed Ameri-
can armed forces in the "firing line," and he did this with no au-
thorization from Congress - indeed without even informing Con-
gress until well after he had carried out his plans.
47
President Jefferson was bitterly criticized in the opposition
press, with the Gazette of the United States declaring that "we see
the executive - because it is popular - can make war when it
pleases .... "48 The Columbian Centinel asked plaintively that, as
the "authority to declare war cannot be delegated or vested, why is
it 'lawful and constitutional to do that against .. . the Barbary
Powers, which it would be unlawful or unconstitutional to do
against Great Britain, France, or any of the other states or na-
tions?' 49 President Jefferson's actions eroded the congressional
war power, and he became the first, but certainly not the last
President to test the divisions between congressional and execu-
tive powers. The immediate consequences may not have been
dire, but such testing and stretching of the constitutional bounda-
ries became the rule, rather than the exception, for President Jef-
ferson's successors.
IV. PRESIDENT LINCOLN - THE WAR POWER AND THE CIVIL WAR
Abraham Lincoln undoubtedly presided (and prevailed) over the
worst moment in United States history, and his anointment as a
political saint is deserved. Yet, did President Lincoln's vigorous
and decisive actions irreparably tear the boundary between con-
gressional and presidential powers that the Framers were so care-
ful to erect?
President Lincoln derived his sense of power not only from what
was actually written in the Constitution, but from what he
thought it might imply in time of national emergency, finding
46. JAVITS, supra note 6, at 38.
47. Id. at 49. President Jefferson did not report the state of affairs in Tripoli to Con-
gress until December 8, 1801. Id. The military actions directed by President Jefferson had
commenced nine months earlier. Id.
48. Id. at 50.
49. Id. at 51.
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what would today be called "penumbral" executive rights.50 Active
warfare began on April 12, 1861, and on April 15, President Lin-
coln proclaimed a state of insurrection and requested a special
session of Congress. 51 Somewhat surprisingly, he did not call for
the special session to meet until July, three months later. Prior to
the session, he requested the activation of the army, claiming the
rebellion was "too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary
course of judicial proceedings." 52 It was this assertion that raised
serious constitutional questions as to the legitimacy of President
Lincoln's actions, notwithstanding his ability as Commander in
Chief to repel attack.
In assuming his role as Commander in Chief, President Lincoln
also assumed the mantle of a "single body legislature."53 He or-
dered funds to be disbursed from the Treasury Department, de-
spite the constitutional language prohibiting such withdrawals
except "in consequence of appropriations made by law."54 He or-
dered the blockade of all Southern ports, a true act of war, without
any congressional declaration or authorization. 55 President Lin-
coln ordered enlargement of the armed forces, ignoring Article I,
Section 8 of the Constitution, which plainly states "Congress shall
... declare war . . . raise and support armies ... make all laws
which shall be necessary to carry into execution the foregoing
powers and all other powers vested in the Government of the
United States."56 While these actions, though clearly unconstitu-
tional, could be justified as an exercise of the Commander in
Chiefs power in the face of rebellion and invasion, President Lin-
coln's unitary actions that resulted in an alteration of the legal
and judicial system could not be justified nor tolerated.
In addition to carrying out the activities outlined above, Presi-
dent Lincoln also suspended the writ of habeas corpus, asserted a
right to order summary arrests, a right to confiscate private prop-
erty and the right to suppress free expression. 57 He prohibited the
50. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). "Penumbral" refers to Justice
Douglas's famous decision in Griswold, in which he held that rights that are not specifically
written in the Constitution may be found in the penumbra cast by other constitutional
rights, particularly those found in the Bill of Rights. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484.
51. Id. at 117.
52. JAVITS, supra note 6, at 117. See also JAMES G. RANDALL, CONSTITUTIONAL
PROBLEMS UNDER LINCOLN (Univ. of Ill. Press 1964) (1951).
53. JAVITS, supra note 6, at 117. See also RANDALL, supra note 52.
54. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9.
55. JAVITS, supra note 6, at 118.
56. Id. at 119. See also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
57. JAVITS, supra note 6, at 119. See also RANDALL, supra note 52.
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mailing of any material he deemed to be against the national in-
terest, and completed this evisceration of the Bill of Rights not
through legislative procedures, but by executive order. 5
8
The Civil War was not only a test of the nation's strength, but a
test of the Constitution itself. While the Constitution, much like
the nation, emerged from the Civil War scarred, it emerged alive,
in large part thanks to the Framers' ability to blend mixed gov-
ernment theories and separation of powers. In the first real test of
the Framers' design, it worked - while Congress could do little to
halt President Lincoln's abuses, the Supreme Court assumed the
role of policeman.
The case was Ex parte Milligan,59 and the opinion of the Court
was delivered by Justice Davis. The petitioner, Milligan, a civilian
and citizen, had been arrested in his home, imprisoned in Indiana
and tried by a military commission under the suspension of the
writ of habeas corpus. 60 His challenge to the conviction brought
the case to the Supreme Court for the examination of three ques-
tions: Should a writ of habeas corpus be issued, should Milligan
be discharged from custody, and did the military commission have
the proper jurisdiction to legally try and sentence Milligan?61
Justice Davis wasted no time in declaring that the importance
of the issues presented in the case "cannot be overstated; for [they]
involve[] the very framework of the government and the funda-
mental principles of American liberty."62 The Court further noted
that "during the late wicked Rebellion, the temper of the times did
not allow that calmness in deliberation ... necessary to a correct
conclusion of a purely judicial question .... Now... this question
• . . can be . . . decided without passion or the admixture of any
element not required to form a legal judgment."63
At the heart of Milligan was President Lincoln's decision to sus-
pend the writ of habeas corpus and to subsequently replace nor-
mal judicial proceedings with martial law and military tribunals.
The Court noted that:
[the] law was passed in a time of great national peril .... The
President had practically suspended [the writ of habeas cor-
pus] and detained suspected persons in custody without trial;
58. JAVITS, supra note 6, at 119-20.
59. 71 U.S. 2 (1866).
60. MiUlligan, 71 U.S. at 107.





but his authority to do this was questioned. It was claimed
that Congress alone could exercise this power; and that the
legislature, and not the President, should judge 0 the political
considerations on which the right to suspend it rested. 64
Justice Davis was careful to highlight, however, that the sus-
pension of the writ does not "authorize the arrest of any one, but
simply denies to one arrested the privilege of this writ in order to
obtain his liberty."65  Therefore, the questions raised were (1)
when the courts could refuse to grant the writ, and (2) when the
citizen had the right to invoke it. While it was acceptable for a
person to be arrested in the name of public safety, the detention of
the person beyond a fixed period without access to the judicial
process could not be justified.
66
A member of the armed forces, under orders from Lincoln, ar-
rested Milligan, held him in a military prison, and tried him under
martial law.67 Was it possible that this military tribunal, under
presidential orders, had the legal authority to try a civilian?
68
Justice Davis characterized this query by stating that "no
graver question was ever considered by this court, nor one which
more nearly concerns the rights of the whole people; for it is the
birthright of every American citizen when charged with crime, to
be tried and punished according to law."69 After detailing the lib-
erties secured and preserved in the Bill of Rights, the Court con-
cluded that, in Indiana, the operation of the federal courts was
never endangered during the Civil War, thus the public safety was
not in grave danger. 70 Further:
no usage of war could sanction a military trial there for any
offence whatever of a citizen in civil life. Congress could
grant no such power; and to the honor of our national legisla-
ture be it said, it has never been provoked by the state of the
country to even attempt its exercise. One of the plainest con-
stitutional provisions was, therefore, infringed when Milligan
64. Id. at 114-15. (emphasis added). The Court further noted that the exigencies of the
time required that the lawfulness of the suspension of habeas corpus be fully established,
and it was under these circumstances that Congress acquiesced to Lincoln's demands for
suspension. Id.
65. Milligan, 71 U.S. at 115.
66. Id. at 125-26.
67. Id. at 118.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 118.
70. Milligan, 71 U.S. at 122.
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was tried by a court not ordained and established by the Con-
gress.7
1
The Court conceded that the suspension of habeas corpus may,
at times, be justified, and that martial rule can properly be ap-
plied. Yet the Court warned that "[m]artial rule can never exist
where the courts are open, and in the proper and unobstructed
exercise of their jurisdiction."
72
In his concurrence, Chief Justice Chase noted that while
Milligan's alleged crimes were grave, "it is more important to the
country and to every citizen that he should not be punished under
an illegal sentence, sanctioned by a court of last resort, than that
he should be punished at all."
7 3
In his simple explanation of the executive and legislative pow-
ers, the Chief Justice remarked that "Congress has the power not
only to raise and support and govern armies, but to declare war.
It has, therefore, the power to provide by law for the carrying on of
war."74  The executive power lies with the President.75  While
both powers imply "subordinate and auxiliary powers," the Presi-
dent cannot, "in war more than in peace, intrude upon the proper
authority of Congress, nor Congress upon the proper authority of
the President. Both are servants of the people."76 Further, the
President may not unilaterally institute judicial tribunals absent
congressional approval. 77
Justice Davis similarly delineated the intention of the Founders.
The Founders recognized that the nation had no "right to expect it
will always have wise and humane rulers, sincerely attached to
the principles of the Constitution."7 8 The Framers were "guarding
the foundations of civil liberty against the abuses of unlimited
power," and left a multitude of rights inviolable. 79 While the Gov-
ernment insisted that the "safety of the country in time of war
demands that this broad claim for martial laws shall be sus-
tained," Justice Davis argued that "if this were true, it could be
71. Id. at 121-22.
72. Id. at 127.
73. Id. at 132 (Chase, C.J., concurring).
74. Id. at 139.
75. Milligan, 71 U.S. at 139 (majority opinion).
76. Id.
77. Id.




well said that a country, preserved at the sacrifice of all the cardi-
nal principles of liberty, is not worth the cost of preservation."80
Ex parte Milligan set out a careful interpretation of the Presi-
dent's war powers, one that is still valid today. The Court recog-
nized the need for the President to be able to freely and decisively
respond to national crises, and very few of President Lincoln's con-
stitutional oversteps in the military area were seriously ques-
tioned. What could not be tolerated, however, was a complete
breakdown of the separation of powers that the Framers had
crafted. No matter what the national crisis, the President could
not usurp Congress's lawmaking abilities, nor could he replace the
Judicial Branch with military tribunals that did not promise the
same guarantees set forth in the Bill of Rights.
The following sections will examine the President's ability to in-
crease his scope of power as Commander in Chief, exemplified by
Presidents Woodrow Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt and Harry Tru-
man, and the subsequent curtailing of that power by the Supreme
Court. The concluding section will examine the Administration of
George W. Bush, which in some areas has behaved within the
bounds set by earlier Administrations and, in other areas, has at-
tempted to expand the executive power in ways never before con-
templated or condoned.
V. PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND WORLD WAR - PRESIDENT
WILSON AND PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT
A. President Wilson and the Era of Total War
Woodrow Wilson presided over the United States at a time
when war, though still regarded as an unnatural state of affairs,
occurred often enough to have its own set of norms.81 The fre-
quency of war in the American experience resulted in an "aggran-
dizement of presidential war power," and President Wilson was
willing to erode the constitutional boundaries even more. 82
While President Wilson was both an intellectual and a strict
moralist, he was comfortable flexing his executive muscle, presid-
ing over the United States' first experience in world war. In ex-
80. Milligan, 71 U.S. at 125-26.
81. JAVITS, supra note 6, at 191. See also The Hague Convention Respecting the Laws
and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2439, T.S. 546.
82. JAVITS, supra note 6, at 192.
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amining the Wilson Administration, former Senator Jacob Javits
writes:
The Wilson Presidency brought to center stage all of the
forces that had been gathering for years on behalf of over-
whelming and undiluted executive power .... [I]t was inevi-
table that presidential authority would assume the large di-
mensions that it has yet to relinquish. Wilson's own intellec-
tual power and his authoritarian personality were fit instru-
ments for the political providence that has shaped our con-
temporary institutions.
8 3
President Wilson believed that the Executive's role in interna-
tional relations was significant and that, as President, he had con-
stitutional supremacy in times of conflict. However, as a political
scientist, President Wilson also wanted to avoid the appearance of
acting unconstitutionally. When war with Germany began in
1917, President Wilson was careful to make an effort to secure
congressional authorization for his actions.
8 4
The actual congressional declaration of war was easily obtained,
with only two members of Congress in opposition to it. However,
disputes as to the proper spheres of congressional and executive
power quickly arose.
Prior to the declaration of war on April 6, 1917, President Wil-
son had sought congressional permission to arm merchant ships
carrying supplies to Europe. The request died after a filibuster
was introduced, but President Wilson proceeded to give the orders
without congressional authorization.8 5 President Wilson stated
that such a measure was "within his own power to enact 'without
special warrant of law, by the plain implication of [his] constitu-
tional duties and powers."'8 6 War arrived a few weeks later, and
President Wilson's action was never challenged. President Wilson
also sought to employ a broad interpretation of the "Executive
Power" under Article II. He instituted the Council for National
Defense and created a series of advisory committees that would
possess executive authority once war was declared.87
83. Id. at 202.
84. Id. at 203.
85. Id.
86. Id. See also THE PUBLIC PAPERS OF WOODROW WILSON (Ray S. Baker and W. E.
Dodd eds., 1927) [hereinafter WILSON PAPERS].
87. JAVITS, supra note 6, at 203-04. The Advisory Committees included the War Indus-
tries Board and the Food Administration, and their regulations were meant to be enforced
with the full power of law. Id. This task was made easier when Congress added statutory
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In addition to creating a multitude of advisory committees,
President Wilson also believed it was in his purview as Com-
mander in Chief to take greater control over the national econ-
omy.8 8 The food supply, links to transportation and communica-
tion, and natural resources, were mobilized into the national ser-
vice. The Lever Act,8 9 which President Wilson proposed to Con-
gress, granted him the authority to control prices and distribution.
The Act also granted him the implementation power that is nor-
mally reserved to the Legislature. 90 Although some legislators
offered resistance to President Wilson's moves, 91 he was able to
override opposition based on a growing national fury towards
Germany and a thirst for war. 92 By December of 1917, President
Wilson had consolidated as much executive power as was possible
- he had the authority to draft citizens under the Selective Ser-
vice Act, 93 executive agencies began taking the place of the Legis-
lature, and Congress itself had delegated many of its powers to the
President.
94
Despite this consolidation of powers, President Wilson still felt
that the Executive should be granted more leeway in time of war.
Specifically, he believed that the Executive required greater effi-
ciency in organizing the Executive Branch. 95 President Wilson
saw the Overman Act 96 as the vehicle through which to achieve
this goal. The provisions of the bill authorized the President to
have total control over the Executive Branch, enabling him to
eliminate or create departments at his own discretion and to dele-
gate his own authority. 97 Quite simply, "if [President] Wilson de-
cided to make foreign policy through the Postmaster General and
authority to this initiative. Id. Congress essentially acquiesced to an expansion of execu-
tive power at the expense of its own. Id. at 204. See also GEORGE F. MILTON, THE USE OF
PRESIDENTIAL POWER, 1789-1943 (1980).
88. JAVITS, supra note 6, at 204.
89. The Food and Fuel Control Act, 65 Cong. Ch. 53, 40 Stat. 276, Aug.10, 1917.
90. Id. at 204-05.
91. Id. Senator Reed objected to Wilson's attempts to control the national economy
and, during floor debate, complained that the more Congress resisted Wilson's power play,
the more "the lash is laid across the legislative back." Id. at 204. The Lever Act was called
"unconstitutional legislation" by the chairman of the Senate Agriculture Committee. Id. at
205.
92. JAVITS, supra note 6, at 204.
93. 40 Stat. 76 (1917).
94. JAVITS, supra note 6, at 205.
95. Id. at 206. See also WILSON PAPERS, supra note 86.
96. 65 Cong. Ch. 78, 40 Stat. 556 (1918).
97. JAVITS, supra note 6, at 204.
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to send the mail through the State Department, the Overman Act
gave him all the authority he needed to do so."98
Although the Act was passed in 1918, it was met with fierce
criticism by the Senate. 99 Senator Cummins declared that the bill
"was unconstitutional because it attempts to delegate legislative
power to the President." 100 He also condemned his fellow Sena-
tors, and America as a whole, for branding those who dissented
with presidential policy as traitors. 101 Senator Cummins argued
that the President's powers in times of war were no greater than
his powers in times of peace. He maintained that the Constitution
was strong enough to meet the challenges of war and should not
be abandoned in times of stress. 10 2 His Milligan-like warnings
were echoed by Senator Knox. Senator Knox opined that the
President had no "war power as such" - that is, the President did
not have more or different powers in times of war. 10 3 The Presi-
dent's authority was limited to his powers as Commander in
Chief, which were distorted and incorrectly expanded by both the
Executive himself and the public at large during active war. 104
President Wilson was an effective speaker and a moralist who
frequently divided the world into good and evil. 105 He employed
his way with words to complete a power grab that essentially re-
sulted in the President exercising absolute control over Con-
gress. 1 0 6 In the thrall of war, national outrage overshadowed good
sense, as the Founding Fathers had feared. Even more troubling
was the fact that President Wilson also attempted to use his new-
found control over the Legislature during peace negotiations.
10 7
The checks and balances the Framers had carefully crafted were
not working - Congress seemed content to grant its powers to the
Executive. This practice was a dangerous precedent, resulting in
exactly the type of "elected monarchy" the Framers had dreaded.
Such a consolidation of absolute power in an individual leaves
the country to the vagaries of history - "entirely too much comes
to depend on the nature of his personality, his staff and advisers,
98. Id. See also 40 Stat. 556.
99. JAVITS, supra note 6, at 206.




104. JAVITS, supra note 6, at 207.
105. Id. at 208. See also JOHN M. BLUM, WOODROW WILSON AND THE POLITICS OF
MORALITY (1956).
106. JAVITS, supra note 6, at 208.
107. Id.
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as well as the image he feels compelled to project in his dealings
with others."108  Regrettably, President Wilson set a trend that
has continued into the twenty-first century.
B. President Franklin Roosevelt Responds to World War
Fortunately, many of the wartime privileges that President Wil-
son carved out for himself receded when the First World War con-
cluded in 1919. Further, a Congress that had been swept away by
war fervor was more than happy to wrest back its power when
peace returned. 0 9 Congress's delayed anger over presidential ac-
tions taken during the war guaranteed certain death for President
Wilson's post-war peace plan and assured that there would be no
American involvement in the League of Nations. 110
President Wilson had presided over a world war that had few
implications for American territory. No invasion of the United
States was attempted, and no attack on American soil occurred.
President Franklin Roosevelt presided over a world war that
would require much more American involvement and sacrifice; to
successfully conduct such a war, he built upon the precedents that
had been set by both President Lincoln and President Wilson.
President Roosevelt's brilliance as a politician cannot be ques-
tioned, and his recognition that America would need to aid Great
Britain in its fight against Nazi Germany, whether or not the
United States ever sent its troops to the actual battlefield, played
a large part in guaranteeing that the Allied Powers would tri-
umph during World War II. Despite the unquestionably good re-
sults of President Roosevelt's actions, his methods prior to the con-
gressional declaration of war on December 8, 1941, stretched the
bounds of constitutionality and solidified the public's perception of
presidential power as both pervasive and unparalleled.
Even before the United States was directly attacked, President
Roosevelt recognized the danger posed by Nazi Germany and its
Axis Allies. 1 ' A natural political genius who learned from his
experiences with the Great Depression, President Roosevelt was
aware of the effect that declaring a "national emergency" 112 would
have on both the public and Congress. In declaring a state of




111. JAVITS, supra note 6, at 215.
112. Id. at 214. See also ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT (1960).
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threatened by Germany - President Roosevelt pioneered a "pre-
war application of the Commander in Chief power." 113  He em-
ployed this power in introducing the Destroyers for Bases 1 4 and
the Lend-Lease 1 5 programs.
During the spring of 1940, British Prime Minister Winston
Churchill approached President Roosevelt and requested Ameri-
can naval assistance. 16 German U-boats were stretching the
British Navy to its limits and reinforcements were necessary.
While Roosevelt did indeed want to involve United States mate-
riel, unilaterally entering into such an arrangement with Prime
Minister Churchill would have been tantamount to entering into a
treaty without the "advice and consent of the Senate."
117
Unwilling to force a constitutional crisis, but also unwilling to
let Great Britain go it alone, by September of 1940, President Roo-
sevelt had devised a plan to provide aid to the British without
having to engage in a political battle with an isolationist Con-
gress. 118 A naval appropriations bill that had been enacted earlier
in President Roosevelt's presidency prohibited the President from
giving any military equipment to a foreign government unless that
equipment was certified by the military as unsuitable to defend
the United States." 9 Engaging in a very creative interpretation of
the bill, President Roosevelt determined this statute to mean that
if he devised an arrangement that strengthened American de-
fense, he could dispose of the unsuitable equipment as he saw fit
as a power implied under his role as Commander in Chief. Presi-
dent Roosevelt unilaterally donated fifty older battleships to Great
Britain in exchange for the use of naval bases on Great Britain's
North Atlantic islands. 12
0
113. JAVITS, supra note 6, at 215.
114. The Destroyers for Bases program was a diplomatic agreement entered into be-
tween United States Secretary of State Cordell Hull and the British Ambassador, The
Marquess of Lothian, C.H. See the Destroyers for Bases Agreement, 2 September 1940,
available at http://www.history.navy.mil/faqs/faq59-24.htm.
115. An Act to Promote the Defense of the United States, 22 U.S.C. § 411 (1941). Essen-
tially, under Lend-Lease, the United States supplied Great Britain, the Soviet Union,
China, France and other Allied nations with vast amounts of war materiel between 1941
and 1945, with the understanding that the materiel would eventually be paid for or re-
turned to the United States. See SIR RICHARD CLARKE, ANGLO-AMERICAN ECONOMIC
COLLABORATION IN WAR AND PEACE, 1942-1949 (1982).
116. JAVITS, supra note 6, at 215. See also WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, THE GRAND
ALLIANCE (Penguin Books Ltd. 2005) (1950).
117. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.





When President Roosevelt's action was criticized, Attorney Gen-
eral Robert Jackson argued that, as Commander in Chief, the
President was entitled to "dispose" the forces at his command.
121
Logically, the Commander in Chief can dispose of those forces and
their equipment as he sees fit. Further, as the arrangement en-
tailed no further American obligation, it was not a treaty - thus,
the advice and consent of the Senate was not constitutionally re-
quired. 1
22
While President Roosevelt's actions may have been necessary,
the justification he proffered illustrated a fundamental misunder-
standing, or intentional misapplication, of the Constitution's
Commander in Chief Clause. Article II, Section 2 of the Constitu-
tion states that the President is the Commander in Chief "of the
Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the sev-
eral States, when called into the actual Service of the United
States."'123 At no time during 1940 was the United States Military
called into the "actual Service of the United States." While the
President remains Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy at
all times, the broader war power aspect of the Commander in
Chief power was meant only to be activated when the United
States was on a war footing. President Roosevelt's prewar activa-
tion of the Commander in Chief powers signaled the start of the
second great test of the Framers' design, a test that only became
more strenuous with the introduction of the Lend-Lease program.
During President Roosevelt's 1941 State of the Union Address,
he stated that the United States must provide "billions of dollars
worth of weapons" to the Allied forces, but was careful to state
that such action would not be an act of war. 124 As part of his pre-
war activation of the Commander in Chief power, however, Presi-
dent Roosevelt wanted total authority to manufacture or purchase
any weapon or war materiel. Additionally, he wanted the freedom
to exchange any war information with any government he selected
and to provide whatever weapons and supplies necessary to sup-
port any nation he thought should receive American backing. 125
121. Id. at 216. After the Destroyers for Bases deal was announced, The New York
Times wrote that the agreement would have been more desirable if it "had the formal
stamp of congressional approval," the Boston Post maintained that the entire deal was
"removed from our rightful democratic process," and the St. Louis Post-Dispatch ran a
headline claiming "Dictator Roosevelt Commits an Act of War." Id. at 216-17.
122. Id. at 216.
123. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (emphasis added).
124. JAVITS, supra note 6, at 217.
125. Id. at 218.
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While President Wilson had attempted to wrest some of this
power, especially in overseeing the economy and food supply and
in the drafting of servicemen through the Selective Service Act,
"no President had ever asked for such wide-ranging authority over
American production and supply in time of peace or war" as Roo-
sevelt.126 Although President Roosevelt faced a Congress that was
less swept away by war fever and more inclined to isolationism,
the Lend-Lease Bill 127 eventually provided nearly all of what Roo-
sevelt requested.
Response to the Lend-Lease Bill was at first overwhelmingly
negative. A New York Daily News headline read "Defense Bill
Gives All War Power to Pres."'128 During congressional hearings
on the Bill, historian Charles Beard told the Senate that the Lend-
Lease Bill would essentially amend the Constitution with respect
to the war power, and President Roosevelt himself made no effort
to disguise his intention of passing the Bill. 129 Secretary of the
Treasury Morgenthau was frank in his testimony that the intent
of the Bill was to give the President "a free hand in the manufac-
ture and distribution of war materiel . . . there was to be no sub-
terfuge." 1
30
During the six weeks of congressional debate, Senator Wheeler
charged that the Bill violated international law, complaining that
"Congress coldly and flatly [has] been asked to abdicate."' 31
Senator Wheeler also declared that passing the Lend-Lease Bill
would indicate open warfare. Congressman Clifford Hope agreed
with Senator Wheeler, maintaining that the Lend-Lease Bill "will
put us in the war in the end just as surely as if Congress had
voted a declaration of war."'13
2
Although opposition was vocal, it was still the minority view.
On March 11, 1941, Lend-Lease passed both houses of Con-
gress. 133 While those Congressmen concerned with the constitu-
tional implications of the Bill had inserted provisions in the final
text that required congressional authorization of expenditures un-
126. Id.
127. 22 U.S.C. § 411 (1941).
128. JAVITS, supra note 6, at 218.
129. Id. See also An Act to Promote the Defense of the United States: Hearing on H.R.
1776 Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 77th Cong. (1941) (statement of Charles
Beard).
130. JAVITS, supra note 6, at 219.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 222.
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der the Bill as well as a clause empowering Congress to repeal the
act by joint resolution, the statute still granted much of Congress's
war power to President Roosevelt. 1
34
The battle over Lend-Lease was a classic illustration of the ten-
sion the Framers wove into the Constitution. Although the Execu-
tive had been designed to operate with "energy" during moments
of crisis, the Framers were also careful to ensure that the Presi-
dent could not be too exuberant. President Roosevelt was still
forced to publicly discuss his intentions and seek some approval
from Congress. Although Congress eventually abdicated much of
its power, stretching the boundary between the Legislative and
Executive Branches, President Roosevelt was not able to unilater-
ally seize that power.
While Roosevelt's critics still complained that his actions would
lead the United States into world war, December 7, 1941 made
those complaints moot. On December 8, 1941, the day after the
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Congress unanimously declared
war on Japan and its allies. World war was again upon the
United States, and President Roosevelt used his Commander in
Chief powers to the fullest. Much like President Lincoln's actions,
President Roosevelt's actions in directing military strategy and
entering into agreements with heads of Allied governments, while
perhaps unconstitutional, were not questioned. President Lincoln
had clearly set the precedent that the Presidentshould be granted
great leeway during a military crisis. Yet, President Roosevelt
resembled President Lincoln in another important, and less com-
plimentary, way: President Roosevelt also led the greatest assault
on civil liberties since President Lincoln, but this time the Su-
preme Court was unable to see past the fog of war to ensure that
constitutional principles were upheld.
During the active phase of the Second World War, the Supreme
Court rendered its infamous decision in Korematsu v. United
States.135 Korematsu was an American citizen of Japanese ances-
try, who had refused to be relocated to an internment camp after
the attack on Pearl Harbor.136 The opinion of the Court was de-
134. Id.
135. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
136. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 215. The issuance of Executive Order No. 9066 after the
attack on Pearl Harbor would later be viewed as one of the most embarrassing and disturb-
ing moments of American history. See PETER IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR: THE STORY OF THE
JAPANESE AMERICAN INTERNMENT CASES (Univ. of Washington Press 1996) (1976). The
Order required that all Americans of Japanese descent living on the West Coast be re-
moved from their homes and forced to live in military internment camps. See Exec. Order
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livered by Justice Black, who at least had the wherewithal to state
that "it should be noted .. that all legal restrictions which curtail
the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately sus-
pect." 137  Yet, despite noting the strict-scrutiny paradigm, the
Court found that "pressing public necessity may sometimes justify
the existence of such restrictions; racial antagonism never can."'
138
Similar paltry justifications continued throughout the opinion.
Justice Black explained that while "compulsory exclusion of large
groups of citizens from their homes . . . is inconsistent with our
basic governmental institutions .... when [the country is] under
conditions of modern warfare . . . the power to protect must be
commensurate with the threatened danger."'
139
In concluding the opinion of the Court, Justice Black wrote that
while Mr. Korematsu argued that he was imprisoned solely be-
cause of his ancestry and no inquiry into his loyalty was ever
made, the Court was "dealing specifically with nothing but an ex-
clusion order."140 He wrote that:
cast[ing] this case into outlines of racial prejudice.., confuses
the issue. Korematsu was not excluded from the Military
Area because of hostility to... his race. He was excluded be-
cause we are at war with the Japanese .... [M]ilitary au-
thorities feared an invasion of our West Coast and felt con-
strained to take ... security measures .... 141
This argument would have perhaps been more persuasive had
the "properly constituted military authorities" also feared Ameri-
can citizens of German and/or Italian ancestry, as the United
States was also involved in total war with Nazi Germany and Fas-
cist Italy.
Justice Roberts's dissent correctly noted that there was a "clear
violation of Constitutional rights," and expressed doubt that the
exclusion order was not precipitated by racial prejudice. 142 Justice
Murphy also dissented and stated that the test of "whether the
No. 9066, 56 Stat. 173 (1942) (not codified, repealed by Pub. L. No. 94-412, 90 Stat. 1258
(1976)). National xenophobia and paranoia resulted in this national disgrace, which was
couched in terms of "safety," "security" and "necessity for the war effort." See Korematsu,
323 U.S. 214.
137. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 215.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 220.
140. Id. at 223.
141. Id. at 223.
142. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 228-29 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
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Government, on a plea of military necessity, can validly deprive
an individual of any of his constitutional rights is whether the
deprivation is reasonably related to a public danger that is 'so
immediate, imminent and impending' as not to admit of delay...
",143 He concluded that no reasonable relation was made to justify
the "sweeping" "racial restriction."144 Justice Murphy further in-
dicated that evidence from governmental papers proved a clear
racial motivation behind the Executive Order that created the in-
ternment camps. 145 Justice Jackson also dissented, stating that:
a civil court cannot be made to enforce an order which violates
constitutional limitations even if it is a reasonable exercise of
military authority. The courts can exercise only the judicial
power, can apply only law, and must abide by the Constitu-
tion, or they cease to be civil courts and become instruments
of military policy. 146
Today, the case has questionable precedential value, and in
1988, the United States Government issued an official apology to
every family affected.147 In 1990, the federal government began
paying reparations to those families. 148
Although it was President Roosevelt who signed the Executive
Order requesting the camps, and while the request was surely un-
constitutional, it was the Supreme Court that failed in this in-
stance. Instead of following the example of the Milligan Court,
the Korematsu Court stated that if the President can justify his
actions by referring to the safety of the United States, he is free to
ignore civil liberties as he sees fit. The greatest failure of the con-
stitutional system developed by the Framers was not the Presi-
dent's overreach, but was the Judicial Branch's failure to fulfill its
role as a "check and balance" to the other branches. Korematsu
still remains a dangerous example today, and though the opinion
was hardly unanimous, its underlying principle - that the Presi-
dent can do as he pleases if the United States is sufficiently
threatened - poses a hazard to our civil liberties sixty years later.
While President Roosevelt was able alter the public's perception
of the presidential role and enlarge the presidential war power,
143. Id. at 234 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
144. Id. at 235.
145. Id. at 236-39.
146. Id. at 247 (Jackson, J. dissenting).
147. The Civil Liberties Act of 1988, 50a U.S.C. § 1989b (1988).
148. Id.
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that power was not infinite. When President Harry Truman at-
tempted to justify domestic actions under the war power, the Su-
preme Court delivered an opinion that finally offered some clarifi-
cation on the matter.
VI. PRESIDENT TRUMAN AND YOUNGSTOWN SHEETAND TUBE Co.
V. SAWYER
Upon President Harry S. Truman's entry into office, he faced
numerous tasks: ending the world war that President Roosevelt
had been managing; deciding whether to unleash the most de-
structive weapon the world had ever seen; convincing Congress to
help re-build Europe; managing the Berlin Airlift; and restructur-
ing the American economy from its war footing to peacetime eco-
nomics. 149 President Truman also presided over a new era of
American dominance on the international scene, the American
entry into the United Nations, and its first armed conflict as a
member of the United Nations. 150 Considering the multitude of
important programs and policies Truman had to manage, it is
ironic that something as innocuous as the seizure of a steel mill
prompted one of "the truly 'great' cases - in every sense of the
word - in the American constitutional law canon."151
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer152 was decided in 1952
while the United States was involved in the Korean Conflict. The
case arose when President Truman issued an order directing the
Secretary of Commerce to "take possession of and operate most of
the Nation's steel mills."'153 This order was issued due to a labor
dispute that arose between the companies and their employees
during 1951.154 The steelworkers threatened a strike when the
existing bargaining agreement expired on December 31, 1951.155
All efforts to resolve the dispute failed, and on April 4, 1952, a na-
tion-wide strike was called. 156
President Truman believed that the necessity of steel as a "com-
ponent of substantially all weapons and other war materials"'157
149. See generally DAVID MCCULLOGH, TRUMAN (1992).
150. Id.
151. Michael Stokes Paulsen, Youngstown at Fifty: A Symposium - Youngstown Goes to
War, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 215, 216 (2006).
152. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
153. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 582.
154. Id.





entitled him to issue an order to seize the steel mills and maintain
production as an "aggregate of his constitutional powers as the
Nation's Chief Executive and the Commander in Chief of -the
Armed Forces of the United States."158 The mill owners argued
that President Truman's order was nothing more than executive
lawmaking outside the bounds of the President's constitutional
powers. 1
59
Justice Black delivered the opinion of the Court, focusing on two
issues: "Should final determination of the constitutional validity of
the President's order be made in this case which has proceeded no
further than the preliminary injunction stage? ... If so, is the sei-
zure order within the constitutional power of the President?"'
160
The procedural issue was resolved in the affirmative, and the
Court focused the majority of the opinion on the second issue. The
Court first noted that "the President's power, if any, to issue the
order must stem either from an act of Congress or from the Con-
stitution itself."'161 Here, there had been absolutely no congres-
sional act or authorization. It was clear that "if the President had
authority to issue the order he did, it must be found in some provi-
sion of the Constitution."'162 Truman contended that his presiden-
tial power should be implied from the cumulative effect of execu-
tive powers listed in the Constitution. 1
63
The majority noted that the President relied on "particular pro-
visions in Article II which say that the 'executive Power shall be
vested in a President . . . .' and that 'he shall take Care that the
Laws be faithfully executed'; and that he 'shall be Commander in
Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States."' 164 The order
could not be sustained, however, as an "exercise of the President's
military power as Commander in Chief. .".. 165 While the Gov-
ernment relied on cases upholding broad war powers, the Court
did not find those cases to be persuasive.166 Justice Black noted
that "even though the theater of war [is] an expanding concept, we
cannot with faithfulness to our constitutional system hold that the
158. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 582.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 584.
161. Id. at 585.
162. Id. at 587.
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Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces has the ultimate power
to take possession of private property ... -167
Nor could the order be upheld under the executive power gener-
ally. The Court stated:
In the framework of our Constitution, the President's power
to see that the laws are . . . executed refutes the idea that he
is . . . a lawmaker. The Constitution limits his functions in
the lawmaking process to the recommending of laws he thinks
wise and the vetoing of laws he thinks bad. 168
In the instant case, President Truman did not direct the imple-
mentation of a congressional policy in a manner indicated by Con-
gress. Instead, he ordered that presidential policy be executed in
a manner directed by him. The Court noted that, should Congress
choose to adopt such a policy of seizing the mills, its authority to
do so would be without question. 1
69
While President Truman argued that other Presidents "without
congressional authority have taken possession of private business
enterprises in order to settle labor disputes,"'170 the Court was un-
ambiguous when it stated that even if such actions have happened
before, "Congress has not lost its exclusive constitutional author-
ity to make laws necessary and proper to carry out the powers
vested by the Constitution in 'the Government of the United
States, or in any Department or Officer thereof."' 171 In the major-
ity's conclusion, Justice Black wrote that:
The Founders of this Nation entrusted the law making power
to Congress alone in both good and bad times. It would do no
good to recall the historical events, the fears of power and the
hopes for freedom that lay behind their choice. Such a review
would but confirm our holding that the seizure order cannot
stand. 172
While the majority opinion offered a clear and concise analysis
of the bounds of the President's war power, Justice Jackson's fa-
mous concurrence also defined the bounds of presidential power.
In his concurrence, Justice Jackson first noted that "comprehen-
167. Id.
168. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 587.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 588.
171. Id. at 588-89.
172. Id. at 589.
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sive and undefined presidential powers hold both practical advan-
tages and grave dangers for the country ... in time of transition
and public anxiety."'173 However, while the "Constitution diffuses
power the better to secure liberty, it also contemplates that prac-
tice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable govern-
ment .... Presidential powers are not fixed but fluctuate, depend-
ing upon their disjunction or conjunction with those of Con-
gress." 1
74
Justice Jackson devised three categories that were illustrative
of the general interactions between Congress and the President
and the legal consequences in each paradigm. The first interac-
tion occurs when "the President acts pursuant to an express or
implied authorization of Congress .... ,,175 In this instance, presi-
dential authority is "at its maximum, for it includes all that he
possesses in his own right, plus all the Congress can delegate."'
176
If the President's actions in this situation are deemed unconstitu-
tional, it is because the "Federal Government as an undivided
whole lacks power."'
177
The second paradigm contemplates the President acting in "ab-
sence of either a congressional grant or denial of authority.' 178 In
this case, he may "only rely upon his own independent powers, but
there is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have
concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain."'179
In this type of situation, inaction on the part of Congress may "en-
able, if not invite" independent presidential action. 80 However,
"any actual test of power is likely to depend on the imperatives of
events and contemporary imponderables rather than on abstract
theories of law."''
The final paradigm considers "when the President takes meas-
ures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Con-
gress."'8 2 In this instance, the President's power is at "its lowest
ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional powers
minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter."'
8 3
173. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 634 (Jackson, J., concurring).
174. Id. at 635.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 635-36.





183. Youngstown, 343 U.S at 637. (Jackson, J., concurring).
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Presidential control in these situations can only be sustained by a
court if the court "disab[les] Congress from acting upon the subject
matter." 
18 4
Although Youngstown was decided over fifty years ago, it is still
relevant today. The decision "resolved a major constitutional cri-
sis, and it did so . ..correctly."'185 Youngstown stands for the
proposition that "the President of the United States possesses no
inherent, unilateral legislative power in time of war or emer-
gency." 186 Further, Youngstown made it clear that the President
"is not and cannot be the sole judge of the scope of his constitu-
tional and statutory powers." 187
Youngstown remains one of the defining war powers cases and
is perhaps even more relevant today as the Bush Administration
undertakes activities far more serious than the relatively innocent
seizure of a steel mill. The following sections of this comment will
analyze the actions of the current administration in light of the
history and precedents discussed above.
VII. THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION AND USE/ABUSE OF THE WAR
POWER
Upon taking office after a contentious election with questionable
results and a popular vote that did not match the electoral college,
it seemed that George W. Bush's Administration was destined to
divide the public just as sharply as the election had. Then, on
September 11, 2001, the Twin Towers fell, the Pentagon was at-
tacked, and something as trivial as disagreement over taxes or
government involvement in social matters no longer mattered.
For a time, even the most liberal of Democrats stood with the most
conservative of Republicans in announcing our united effort to
find and punish the perpetrators of this crime against humanity
- our united effort to wage a war against terrorism itself.
But in the aftermath of that visceral reaction to September 11,
our Constitution may be facing its greatest threat. That reaction
has entailed secret wiretapping, the return of military tribunals,
internment of citizens with no due process, and unprecedented
numbers of presidential signing statements. All of these activities
have been casually discussed and even more casually implemented
184. Id. at 638.
185. Paulsen, supra note 151, at 215.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 216.
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because we are at "war" - because we need to keep America safe.
But who or what are we fighting? And are we eviscerating our
Constitution to do so?
A. What is a "War on Terror?"
Few words are as capable of capturing the imagination as
"war."188  In the popular sense, the term connotes "magnitude"
and "resolve," and of course military action.18 9 In a legal sense, it
means something more. When used by international lawyers or
diplomats, it denotes an armed conflict between two states or state
actors, replete with its own set of rules and norms. It begins with
a declaration by one or both of the states involved, and it ends
with some type of peace treaty or accord. 190
Clearly a war on terror is not a traditional war. Terrorists typi-
cally are not "state actors" (although some states may sponsor ter-
rorism) nor are there terrorist "states" in our modern sense of the
term against which we can declare war. 191 Terrorists are certainly
not going to act in compliance with the rules of international law
and the rules of war - their very philosophies espouse the flout-
ing of those rules and norms, and their tactics are specifically de-
signed to harm the non-combatants and citizens those rules and
norms are meant to protect.192 Terrorists are not easily identifi-
able, and there are myriad groups, cells and philosophies. Not all
terrorists are Islamists, nor do all terrorist acts aim to destroy the
West. 193 It is difficult to declare war against an individual terror-
ist leader, and there will be no peace treaty or accord after a num-
ber of years of fighting. 194 Terrorists have nothing to lose or to
gain by such an accord, and there are always new recruits ready to
join the cause.195 The traditional sense of "war" can hardly apply
188. Fr6ddric M6gret, "War"? Legal Semantics and the Move to Violence, 13 EUR. J. INT'L
L. 361, 362 (2002).
189. Id. at 363.
190. MALCOLM M. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 1069 (5th ed. 2003).
191. JESSICA STERN, THE ULTIMATE TERRORISTS 7 (1999).
192. BRUCE HOFFMAN, INSIDE TERRORISM 34-36 (1998).
193. STERN, supra note 191, at 6-8. Stern not only discusses the "popular" Islamist
terrorist groups, but also writes about terrorist groups at work in the United States itself.
Id. at 8. The Christian Patriots, for example, advocate a brand of survivalist ideals, racism
and virulent opposition to government, and have shown an interest in obtaining biological
weapons. Id.
194. HOFFMAN, supra note 192, at 41.
195. Id. Hoffman writes that 'The terrorist is not pursuing purely egocentric goals ....
(Tihe terrorist is fundamentally an altruist: he believes that he is serving a 'good' cause
designed to achieve a greater good for a wider constituency .... " Id. at 43.
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to a conflict against terrorism. War in the legal sense is not an act
of aggression against an idea or philosophy, no matter how harm-
ful the idea may be. So why does the Administration speak about
declaring a "war on terror," and what kind of "war" is it?
Employing the term "war" serves a multitude of purposes in
sustaining what will undoubtedly be a long conflict with few tan-
gible victories. First, use of the term serves a useful political pur-
pose - specifically, it unites the country, and enables the Execu-
tive to place demands on Congress in the name of national secu-
rity. (Much as Roosevelt's penchant for declaring an "emergency"
had the same effect.) It may also provide a legal justification that
can be used in both the international and domestic sphere. 196 La-
beling the current conflict a "war" also denotes that it is some-
thing operating within the confines of the laws of war and that
those laws can be applied to our current actions. 197
The Supreme Court, however, in its most recent cases dealing
with the "war on terror," has been reluctant to think of it as a tra-
ditional war and even more reluctant to apply the traditional law
of war to a conceivably never-ending conflict. 198 Further, while
Congress granted an "Authorization for the Use of Military Force"
[hereinafter AUMF] immediately after the September 11 at-
tacks, 199 members of Congress and the Supreme Court have stated
that this authorization was not meant to be a "blank check" for all
matters regarding the "war on terror."200  The present conflict
does not fall neatly into any of Justice Jackson's categories of war.
In some instances, it may be likened to a "Category One" conflict,
under which President Bush's actions would clearly be within the
bounds of constitutionality. At other times, the conflict enters the
"Category Three" sphere at the other end of the spectrum, or the
"zone of twilight" middle ground, also called the "Category Two"
area. The Supreme Court has been immensely helpful in defining
the bounds of the Executive's powers in each realm.
196. M6gret, supra note 188, at 365.
197. Joanne Mariner, The Supreme Court, the Detainees and the War on Terrorism,
FINDLAW, July 5, 2004, http://writ.lp.findlaw.com/Mariner/20040705.html.
198. Id.
199. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
200. Edward Lazarus, Warantless Wiretapping and Why It Seriously Imperils the Sepa-
ration of Powers and Continues the Executive's Sapping of Powers from Congress and the
Courts, FINDLAW, December 22, 2005, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/lazarus/20051222.html.
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B. Actions Within the Bounds of Constitutionality
It is true that the President has "certain inherent powers that
Congress may not limit."20 1 Yet, those powers which are inherent
to the Executive are further divided into two areas: those which
are "exclusive powers - unregulable by Congress," 20 2 and those
which are mere "default powers - exercisable by the President...
but nonetheless subject to Congressional override."
20 3
In the area of "exclusive" powers, the Executive is largely free to
do as he pleases, despite congressional displeasure. For example,
Congress has no power to prevent the President from issuing par-
dons to anyone he chooses, nor can Congress pass legislation di-
recting the President to take the advice of the Secretary of State
over that of the Secretary of Defense. 20 4 Therefore, under this
paradigm, President Bush is free to conduct the war in Afghani-
stan as he sees fit and is free to rely on the advice of the Defense
Secretary when it comes to conducting operations in Iraq. No
matter what the policy arguments on either side of the aisle may
be, President Bush is entitled to exercise these powers without
regard to congressional advice or criticism.
Additionally, pursuant to the understanding of the war power
laid out in Youngstown, presidential power is at its highest when
the President works concurrently with Congress. 20 5 That means
that all matters exercised under the Commander in Chief power in
both Afghanistan and Iraq are within the bounds of constitutional-
ity.
Immediately after the September 11 attack on the United
States, Congress issued the AUMF 206 on September 18, 2001.
According to the text of that Authorization, the "President is au-
thorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those
nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, author-
ized, committed or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on
September 11, 2001 . . . .Nothing in this resolution supersedes
any requirement of the War Powers Resolution."
20 7
201. Michael C. Dorf, What are the "Inherent" Powers of the President? How the Bush





205. Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
206. Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
207. Id. See also War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (1973). The War Powers
Resolution was enacted in 1973 in response to what Congress saw as the "Imperial Presi-
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While the delegation of authority is quite broad, it is limited to
those who attacked the United States on September 11, 2001.
After investigation and intelligence gathering, the perpetrators
were determined to be members of al Q'adea, an Islamist terrorist
organization led by Osama bin Laden. Intelligence further stated
that bin Laden was hiding in Afghanistan and that the Taliban
state there was providing aid to the al Q'adea organization. 
208
Based on this congressional authorization, President Bush has
total authority to engage in armed conflict with Afghanistan, to
pursue al Q'adea operatives throughout the world in a manner he
deems fit - in short, to engage all of his Commander in Chief
powers in the pursuit of al Q'adea. Whatever policy disagree-
ments one might have with the conduct of the war in Afghanistan
or the handling or mishandling of the search for bin Laden, Presi-
dent Bush is within his constitutional power in this area. Much as
Presidents Lincoln, Wilson and Roosevelt were able to exercise
their Commander in Chief powers in the actual conduct of war, so
too may Bush conduct the actual warfare in the manner he deems
most effective.
Similarly, the conflict in Iraq is within the constitutional bounds
of President Bush's power as Commander in Chief. While public
opinion has been extremely critical of the war with Iraq, Congress
authorized a pre-emptive war against Iraq. The policy debate over
whether the war with Iraq was (a) justified, (b) a violation of in-
ternational law, or (c) totally unrelated to war with al Q'adea is an
important and necessary debate, but it has no effect on Bush's es-
sential constitutional authority to conduct such a war.
As has been seen previously, the President's power is at its
highest when Congress has declared war or granted approval of
the President's actions. Further, once war is declared, the Presi-
dent's power as Commander in Chief to conduct war is not often
questioned. President Bush is clearly acting within the bounds of
constitutionality in his conduct of war against Afghanistan, al
Q'adea and Iraq. As has also been the case in the past, however, it
is in the area of domestic relations and civil liberties that the
President's war power is at its lowest, and it is in these areas that
dency" of the Vietnam War. It essentially requires that the Executive and Legislature will
work collectively during times of conflict, and emphasizes that the President may not place
the Armed Forces in the line of fire absent a congressional declaration of war, specific au-
thorization, or a national emergency created by attack upon the United States. See also
Paulsen, supra note 151, at 251.




a President is most likely to engage in unconstitutional activities.
President Bush is no exception.
C. Actions Outside the Bounds of Constitutionality
Congress may limit the "the President's powers as Commander
in Chief,"20 9 because the war power is a concurrent power. In cer-
tain areas of the war power, the President's powers are considered
"default powers."210 That is because the President may only have
exclusive authority if Congress fails to act in a manner in which it
is constitutionally authorized to act. This understanding of the
President's power relative to Congress's indicates that, for exam-
ple, if Congress failed to prescribe rules for the discipline of the
armed forces, the President could then issue any order he saw fit
to deal with insubordination or deserters.211 As commentator Mi-
chael Dorf notes, however, it is important to remember that "in-
herent Presidential authority ... is only a default setting. It can
be changed by Congress."
212
The power of Congress to change the "default setting" comes di-
rectly from the Constitution itself. In the areas where the legisla-
tive authority is supreme, it would completely defeat the princi-
ples of separation of powers to allow the President to simply ig-
nore the rules and regulations passed by Congress. This is pre-
cisely the constitutional barrier President Bush faces in regard to
the wiretapping program. 2
13
The Administration has claimed that the Executive has the
power to order "wartime" warrantless surveillance of United
States citizens. Setting aside the enormous Fourth Amendment
problems with this sweeping statement, this is an area in which
the President operates under his "default setting." While the
President is surely the Commander in Chief of the armed services,
Congress specifically has the power "to make Rules for the Gov-
ernment and Regulation of the land and naval Forces."
214
In the specific area of wiretapping, Congress has made rules
and regulations through the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act




213. Id. 3. See also Lazarus, supra note 200.
214. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, c. 14.
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(FISA).215 Not only would an order for warrantless wiretapping
where Congress has already passed legislation in that area violate
the Constitution, it would also violate the legally enacted statute.
It is impermissible for the Executive to hold himself above the
law, whether in peace or in war. A recent federal court ruling on
the wiretapping issue found the program to be unconstitutional
and indicated great disturbance at the total disregard for separa-
tion of powers, with the court remarking "there are no hereditary
Kings in America and no powers not created by the Constitu-
tion."21
6
In the wiretapping instance, the Executive is clearly acting in a
"Category Three" zone - directly contrary to the expressly stated
will of the Legislature. The President's power, war or any other, is
at its absolute lowest in this instance, and the unconstitutionality
of the act is clear - the policy debate over the necessity of such a
program during wartime notwithstanding. The "zone of twilight"
areas are just as troubling.
The issues of detainees' rights and the use of military tribunals
have largely comprised the "zone of twilight" or "Category Two"
area under this Administration. The major cases dealing with
these issues, Rasul v. Bush,217 and Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 218 for the
most part found some relief for the detainees.
In Rasul, aliens being detained at Guantanamo Bay brought ac-
tions contesting the legality and conditions of their confine-
ment.21 9 In the majority opinion, Justice Stevens defined the is-
sue as "whether United States courts lack jurisdiction to consider
challenges to the legality of the detention of foreign nationals cap-
tured abroad in connection with hostilities and incarcerated at the
Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba."220
The petitioners were captured in Afghanistan during the hostili-
ties between the United States and the Taliban and had been held
215. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-11, 1821-29, 1841-46, 1861-62 (1978); see Dorf, supra note 201,
3. Dorf further notes that some supporters of the Administration argue that since the
National Security Agency (NSA), the governmental body carrying out the wiretapping, is a
civilian body, Congress has no power. Id. However, the President then, exercising his
power as Commander in Chief of the armed forces, would have no power to executively
legislate in this area either. Id.
216. ACLU v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754, 781 (E.D. Mich. 2006) (currently
stayed, pending appeal to the 6th Circuit).
217. 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
218. 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
219. Rasul, 542 U.S. 467.
220. Id. at 470.
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at Guantanamo since 2002.221 The petitioners alleged that they
had never been combatants against the United States and had not
engaged in terrorist acts.222 Further, they alleged that they had
been held captive without having been charged with a crime, argu-
ing that they were denied access to counsel and the courts. 223 The
district court dismissed the action on the basis that "aliens de-
tained outside the sovereign territory of the United States may
not invoke a petition for a writ of habeas corpus,"224 and the court
of appeals affirmed.
225
The Supreme Court reversed, noting that the standards and
scope of habeas corpus had developed since the seventeenth cen-
tury.226 The Court focused on whether the habeas statute "confers
a right to judicial review of the legality of Executive detention of
aliens in a territory over which the United States exercises ple-
nary and exclusive jurisdiction, but not 'ultimate sovereignty."'
227
Distinguishing the present case from earlier decisions of the
Court, Justice Stevens held that:
in the end, the answer to the question presented is clear. Pe-
titioners contend that they are being held in federal custody
in violation of the laws of the United States . . . . Section
2241, by its terms requires nothing more. We therefore hold
that Section 2241 confers on the District Court jurisdiction to
hear petitioners' habeas corpus challenge .... 228
The majority went even further, stating unequivocally that
"federal courts have jurisdiction to determine the legality of the
Executive's potentially indefinite detention of individuals who
claim to be wholly innocent of wrongdoing."229 Maintaining a
Milligan-like approach, the Supreme Court asserted its constitu-
tional power to review the legality of the acts of the Executive
Branch, a power essential to the separation of powers.
221. Id. at 470-71.
222. Id. at 471-72.
223. Id. at 72.
224. Rasul, 542 U.S at 472-73 (citing Rasul v. Bush, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55, 68 (D.D.C.
2002), reversed and remanded by Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004)).
225. Id. at 473.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 475. See also Lease of Lands for Coaling and Naval Stations, Feb. 23, 1903,
U.S. - Cuba, Art. III T.S. No. 418.
228. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 483-84.
229. Id. at 487 (emphasis added).
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While the Rasul decision set the stage for the allowance of de-
tainee petitions, it was the Hamdi case that actually examined the
legality of the detention itself. Hamdi dealt with the "legality of
the Government's detention of a United States citizen, on United
States soil, as an 'enemy combatant,"' 230 and addressed the "proc-
ess that is constitutionally owed to one who seeks to challenge his
classification as such."23
1
The Court, in an opinion by Justice O'Connor, first dealt with
the threshold question of "whether the Executive has the author-
ity to detain citizens who qualify as 'enemy combatants."' 232 The
Court, clearly uncomfortable with the notion of a pervasive "war
on terror," confined the phrase "enemy combatant" to mean one
who was "part of or supporting forces hostile to the United States
or coalition partners in Afghanistan."
233
The Government immediately asserted that no congressional
authorization was needed to detain Hamdi because the "Executive
possesses plenary authority to detain pursuant to Article II of the
Constitution."234 The Court chose not to reach that question, in-
stead finding authorization to detain those involved in the conflict
in Afghanistan under the AUMF. 235 Justice O'Connor again was
careful to limit the discussion to the tangible conflict in Afghani-
stan, rather than the more nebulous "war on terror." Thus, while
the Court did find a basis for Hamdi's detention, it was not in the
sweeping power of the Executive, but rather in congressional au-
thorization.
The Court also determined that Hamdi was entitled to due
process. The majority felt a balancing test would be most appro-
priate in determining what process is due. 236 Stating that "it is
during our most challenging and uncertain moments that our Na-
tion's commitment to due process is most severely tested; and it is
in those times that we must preserve our commitment at home to
the principles for which we fight abroad," 237 the Court held that a
"citizen-detainee seeking to challenge his classification as an en-
emy combatant must receive notice of the factual basis for his
classification, and a fair opportunity to rebut the Government's
230. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 509 (2004).
231. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 509.
232. Id. at 516.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 517.




factual assertions before a neutral decisionmaker. 238  Further-
more, the Court stated:
In sum, while the full protections that accompany challenges
to detentions in other settings may prove unworkable . . . in
the enemy combatant setting, the threats to military opera-
tions posed by a basic system of independent review are not so
weighty as to trump a citizen's core rights to challenge mean-
ingfully the Government's core case .... 239
The majority also stated that its holding indicated a rejection of
the Government's "assertion that separation of powers principles
mandate a heavily circumscribed role for the courts in such cir-
cumstances." 240 The view that courts may not examine individual
cases "cannot be mandated by any reasonable view of separation
of powers" and serves only to "condense power into a single branch
of government."241 The Court stressed that even "the war power
does not remove constitutional limitations safeguarding essential
liberties."24
2
Thus, in these "Category Two" or "zone of twilight" areas, the
Supreme Court has been careful to remind the Executive that con-
stitutional rights may not be suspended for enemy combatants,
especially citizens who have been labeled as such. Particularly in
Hamdi, the Supreme Court envisioned a robust role for itself in
policing the "zone of twilight" in the war on terror. The Court has
been reluctant to embrace the war on terror as an over-arching
justification for all that the Executive seeks to do and has also
been reluctant to embrace it as a legal paradigm within in which
to work. Sighting the perhaps indefinite nature of a war on terror,
the Court refuses to employ that rubric in determining issues such
as habeas corpus or due process for detainees. Instead, the Court
has fulfilled its role in the constitutional scheme and has indicated
just how far the Executive may go before treading into unconstitu-
tional actions.
The last area in which the Executive has displayed disregard for
the Constitution and the principles of American Government is
not precisely a "war power" area, but President Bush's unprece-
238. Id. at 533.
239. Id. at 535.
240. Id.
241. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 536-37.
242. Id. at 537.
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dented use of signing statements, which is also indicative of a lar-
ger disregard for constitutional boundaries.
According to a recent study by the American Bar Association,
President Bush has issued signing statements for over 800 stat-
utes, more than all previous Presidents combined. The signing
statements, in effect, state that "Bush reserves a right to revise,
interpret or disregard measures [of bills he is signing] on national
security and constitutional grounds. ' 243 According to Michael
Greco, then president of the ABA, "'The report raises serious con-
cerns crucial to the survival of our democracy. If left unchecked,
the president's practice does grave harm to the separation of pow-
ers doctrine, and the system of checks and balances that have sus-
tained our democracy for more than two centuries."' 244
The strategic use of signing statements has raised serious con-
cerns. First, Congress is unable to respond to signing statements;
therefore, it may "hamstring" the signed bill and the Legislature
in the future. Second, such an employment of the signing state-
ment, normally a rare event, indicates the Executive's confusion
regarding his role, as well as his disregard for the other branches
of government. The problem is deemed serious enough that Re-
publican Senator Arlen Specter, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary
Committee, stated that he was planning to submit legislation to
"authorize the Congress to undertake judicial review of those sign-
ing statements with the view to having the President's acts de-
clared unconstitutional."'
245
Overall, the Executive's tendency to use the war on terror as a
justification for acts that range from questionably valid to pat-
ently unconstitutional is troubling. Further, President Bush's dis-
regard for basic separation of powers principles and his notion
that neither the Supreme Court nor Congress should challenge his
decisions, point to the possibility of a constitutional crisis. The
Executive shows contempt for the Constitution and a disregard for
his own role that has not often been evidenced in American his-
tory. The problem is not that the President takes actions with
which some may disagree; the problem is that these actions "make
243. ABA- Bush Violating Constitution, AP WIRE SERVICE, July 24, 2006,
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,205205,00.html.
244. Id.




a mockery of much of the Constitution the President has sworn to
uphold." 2
46
D. Avoiding a Constitutional Crisis
The Constitution is more than a mere document; it is the living
blueprint to our uniquely American system of government. That
system has largely worked and worked well for over two centuries
because of the flexibility of the Constitution. It can expand and
contract as is necessary; it protects the power of the people and
concurrently limits the power of government, lest it become too
intrusive, too monarchical.
The success of our constitutional system as it applies to the fed-
eral government is largely predicated on the separation of powers
principles and mixed government principles that the Framers
wove into it. Above all, the Framers wanted to check every branch
of government, lest one become too powerful. It is unfortunate
that oftentimes during a state of military crisis, the Executive
Branch exceeds its constitutional framework in many areas. This
tendency has been well documented throughout our history, and
during these times, it is imperative that the Legislative and Judi-
cial Branches perform their functions. For the most part, our con-
stitutional system does work, and during wartime, the Legislative
and Judicial Branches have been willing and able to assure that
the Executive remains in his proper sphere of power.
In the past, wartime has meant a traditional understanding of
war. There was a fixed period of hostilities, a known enemy, and
set rules to follow. Wartime oversteps by the Executive would be
quickly corrected when peace returned. The conflict we are cur-
rently facing does not fit this mold. The "war on terrorism" will
not likely conclude the minute President Bush leaves office and
his successor is sworn in. While President Bush has certainly
overstepped the boundaries of his office into unconstitutional ter-
ritory, his successor may be in danger of committing similar un-
constitutional acts. It is imperative that we develop a framework
to prevent a continual erosion of the separation of powers and sys-
tem of checks and balances in the name of a never-ending war.
First, it is undisputed that when a properly authorized instance
of armed conflict occurs, the President's power is at its highest,
and historically, his actions are not subjected to strict constitu-
246. Dorf, supra note 201, 32.
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tional scrutiny. The real danger is in the use of the war power to
erode civil liberties and the use of "war" to justify unconstitutional
domestic actions.
To prevent such actions, the Legislative Branch must be careful
in assuring it does not delegate its constitutional power to the Ex-
ecutive whenever an "emergency" is declared. Acts such as the
War Powers Resolution have been helpful in the past to remind
the Executive of the bounds of his war power; new legislation
which specifically deals with the difficulties inherent in the war on
terror should be drafted to codify Supreme Court decisions which
have thus far defined the boundaries of the Executive. Clear
statutory schemes will aid future Presidents in operating within
their constitutional bounds. Additionally, Congressional Over-
sight Committees must vigorously examine Executive actions, not
hesitating to indicate which programs run afoul of the Constitu-
tion.
The Judicial Branch also plays a great role in maintaining the
boundaries set by the Constitution. Thus far, the current Court
has done an admirable job of deciding difficult "Category Two"
issues. The Court must follow the example set by the Milligan
Court and dispassionately examine the issues before it. As multi-
ple Courts have said, there is no separate Constitution in war-
time, and the President has no more powers in war than he does
in peace. Clear rulings, based on consistent constitutional read-
ings in the areas of civil liberties and the war power, must con-
tinue to be issued by the Supreme Court. These rulings may then
be codified by the Legislature, providing a legal framework in
which the Executive may be sure he has the greatest power to
both protect our shores and the liberties that set us apart from
those who would do us harm.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In examining the war power, this comment first provided an
historical overview of the development of the Constitution and its
application by Presidents such as John Adams, Thomas Jefferson,
Abraham Lincoln, Woodrow Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt, Harry
Truman and, finally, George W. Bush. This overview indicated
that the Framers originally viewed the Executive Branch as the
least powerful of the branches and deemed it the most likely to
pose a danger to American citizens.
An examination of earlier Presidents' actions during times of
war illustrated the importance of the constitutional boundaries
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the Framers erected. Declaring war or involving the United
States in armed conflict was never intended to be an easy task,
and few Presidents have found it so. When a state of war exists,
however, it is then that the Executive has found it easiest to over-
step his constitutional boundaries. While the President often con-
ducts the actual warfare in a manner that may have constitutional
implications, these small problems are largely overlooked in defer-
ence to the powers of the Commander in Chief. Most problematic
is that, historically, the Constitution has been ignored in areas of
civil liberties during times of war.
President Lincoln felt little restriction in eviscerating the Bill of
Rights, President Wilson was more than willing to use wartime as
an excuse to restructure the Executive Branch in a manner more
to his liking, and President Roosevelt's disturbing executive order
regarding internment camps cannot be constitutionally justified.
The Executive's tendency to stretch the boundaries of the Consti-
tution is, therefore, nothing new in American history. What is
new is both the type of war in which we are currently engaged and
the sheer breadth of civil liberties President Bush is willing to ig-
nore in forging what several commentators have termed, at best,
an "imperial presidency," at worst, a monarchy.
This comment further examined what a "war on terror" might
mean and why the Administration would employ the term "war"
in dealing with a clearly non-traditional conflict. Public unity and
political expediency both may explain the strategic decision to
term this current crisis a "war on terror." Accepting the war
paradigm as a means for analysis, this comment also concluded
that President Bush has used his Commander in Chief powers
with regard to the armed conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq no dif-
ferently than his predecessors - that is, his actions are constitu-
tionally supported in this area.
What this comment truly questions is Bush's use of the war
power to trample civil liberties and exceed the authority of the
Executive far beyond what the Framers would have imagined.
The secret wiretapping program was patently unconstitutional,
and the Supreme Court carefully delineated the Executive's
boundaries in detainee situations. What was especially troubling,
however, was not the response of the other branches - indeed the
separation of powers principles have worked thus far in checking
the Administration - but the utter disregard the Executive has
shown for that principle.
Particularly illustrative is the overuse of signing statements
employed by President Bush. The Executive is not a Court or a
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Legislature. It may not interpret laws, nor hold that it will only
follow those laws with which it agrees. There is no supreme
branch of government in our system, and this Administration's
unconstitutional use of executive power to create such a supreme
branch is the real danger. As Justice Jackson wrote, "With all its
defects, delays and inconveniences, men have discovered no tech-
nique for long preserving free government except that the Execu-
tive be under the law, and that law be made by parliamentary de-
liberations." 247 Inconvenient as it may be, that is our American
system of governance, and today it is under attack by an Execu-
tive who would place himself above the very laws and Constitution
that he swore to uphold.
In order to prevent further abuses by this President and his
successors, this comment suggests the development of a legal
framework incorporating new legislative measures defining the
executive power during a non-traditional conflict, the codification
of recent Supreme Court rulings in this area, and the continued
willingness of the Court to dispassionately examine the issues be-
fore it and not be swayed from enforcing the Constitution even in
the face of a war on terrorism. In doing so, future lawmakers
would do well to keep in mind the words of Justice Warren:
Implicit in the term "national defense" is the notion of defend-
ing those values and ideas which set this Nation apart .... It
would indeed be ironic if, in the name of national defense, we
would sanction the subversion of ... those liberties ... which
makes the defense of the Nation worthwhile.
248
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